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I. INTRODUCTION

Colorado is the leading prior appropriation state of the American
West. In contrast to the riparian states of the East and the hybrid prior
appropriation states of the West, Colorado remains loyal in its adherence to a common-law doctrine of water rights that emerged from the
mining and irrigation practices in place at the time of statehood.'
However, as the population and economy of the West becomes increasingly urbanized and less agricultural,' effective management of water
rights will test Colorado water law. In particular, the growth of gateway
communities in the Colorado Rocky Mountains-and their increasing

t J.D., December 2004, University of Missouri, Kansas City. My special thanks go
to ProfessorJohn W. Ragsdale, Jr., Professor of Law at the University of Missouri, Kansas City, for his inspiration, guidance, and expertise in the field.
1.
See COLO. CONST. art. XVI, §§ 5, 6; GEORGE VRANESH, VRANESn'S COLORADO
WATER LAW 7 (James N. Corbridge, Jr. & Teresa A. Rice eds., rev. ed. 1999).
2. The West experienced a 75 percent increase in population during the period
from 1960 to 1990, during which domestic use of water rose from withdrawals of 6.5
million acre-feet ("af") to 14 million af.
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economic and political clout--could pose challenges to the state's
pronounced rejection of the public trust doctrine.' The recent decision of the Colorado Supreme Court to affirm water court decisions
granting instream flows to the cities of Golden, Breckenridge, and Vail,
and the legislative acknowledgment of local government influence on
water development, foreshadow this proposition.'
The Importance of Gateway Communities in Colorado
The Western economy grew from intensive farming and natural resource development. But times have changed significantly, bringing a
new economic era featuring a new service sector dominated by professionals and accompanying support jobs that no longer rely on raw resource development.' Historically, access to repositories of raw materials provided the economic benefit to Western rural communities,
especially.! But as the new service sector grows, gateway communities
are finding economic benefits from marketing their natural landscape
and outdoor amenities in the growing recreation and tourism industry.' For example, when nearly one third of the economic base of
Kremmling, Colorado, was impacted by the permanent closing of the
Louisiana Pacific wafer board plant in 1991, the tiny community of
about 1,200 residents responded by drafting an economic development

3. SeeJon Sarche, Recreational Users Win Water _Rights in the West, THE PHILADELPHIA
INQUIRER, June 25, 2003, at A2 (stating that the popularity of outdoor sports like kayaking and fishing has helped the recreation industry gain political clout in the West).
The competition among members of the recreation industry is likely to heat up as
hydroelectric dams are expected to be relicensed in the next fifteen years. Id.
4.
See David F. Jankowski et al, The 1969 Act's Contributions to Local Governmental
Water Suppliers, 3 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 20 (1999) (noting that public water supply is
particularly a function of local government, which has gained significant importance
with the dual emergence of the 1969 Water Right Determination Act and rapid urbanization of the state's population); See GregoryJ. Hobbs, Jr., Colorado Water Law: An
Historical Overview, 1 U. DEN. WATER L. REv. 1, 16 (1997) (stating that currently municipal government entities, including quasi-governmental entities like sanitation districts, are primary parties in the water acquisition arena).
5. See State Eng'r v. Golden, 69 P.3d 1027, 1028 (Colo. 2003), affg by an equally
divided court, en banc, Decree, In re Application for Water Rights of the City of Golden,
No. 98CW448 (Water Ct. Div. 1, June 13, 2001) [hereinafter Golden Decree], available
at http://www.courts.state.co.us/supct/watercourts/wat-divl/ordergolden.htm.
6. See, e.g., Raymond Rasker, A New Look at Old Vistas: The Economic Role of Environmental Quality in Western PublicLands, 65 U. COLO. L. REv. 369, 373 (1994).
7. Id at 375.
8. See id. at 378. From 1969 to 1991, most of the two million new jobs added in
the Rocky Mountain West were service-related. Id. at 377. While in 1969 more than 11
percent of direct employment was in the natural resource industries, by 1991, these
industries provided less than 6 percent of all employment in the region, whereas service industries comprised over 81 percent of all employment. Id.
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plan marketing its environmental quality, including the designation of
the nearby upper Colorado River as a scenic byway.'
Vail, Colorado is the prime example of a burgeoning gateway
community that developed around a modern recreation based economy. Unlike surrounding revival towns like Aspen that started as mining settlements, Vail was born a small ski resort." But like many of the
surrounding mountain communities in the later half of the twentieth
century, the resort-turned-town" marketed its unique location and
natural amenities and quickly became a resort phenomenon,"2 sporting
luxurious spas and resorts, fabulous ski facilities, and decadent housing" for its wealthy visitors. But for its location in the high peaks of the
Colorado Rockies, it is doubtful the town would have achieved such
wealth. Vail and other gateway communities to the Rockies are examples of communities finding economic wealth in the quality of the
natural environment and the non-consumptive use of natural resources, both considered essential in retaining existing businesses and
attracting new ones."
More recently, mountain municipalities have emphasized other
forms of outdoor adventure and recreation as part of the repertoire of
available activities that help sustain the local economy year-round. 5
The latest trend across Colorado has been to host the whitewater sports
of boating and kayaking,' 6 which depend, of course, on water supply
and the right to use it.
9. Id. at 384.
10. SeeJohn W. Ragsdale, Jr., National Forest Land Exchanges and the Growth of Vail
and Other Gateway Communities, 31 URB. LAw. 1, 1-2 (1999) (describing the emergence
of Vail as the quintessential modern gateway community).
11.
The town of Vail became incorporated in 1965, three years after the ski resort
opened. Id. at 2, n.1.
12. The resort town is so popular that even its manhole covers are a commodity.
Marcia Martinek, Candidate, Issues and Manhole Covers, HERALD DEMOCRAT, July 23,
2004, available at http://www.leadvilleherald.com/archives/072904.pdf.
13. Of every four residences in Vail, three are occupied only a few weeks each year
as second homes. Ed McMahon & Luther Propst, Park Gateways, NAT'L PARKS,
May/June 1998, at 39.
14. Rasker, supra note 6, at 378. The remote nature of rural gateway communities
an economic benefit, drawing a growing number of professionals seeking to escape the
urban life for a higher quality of life in the country with entire firms migrating to more
remote small-town communities, a phenomenon known as "green-fielding," made
possible largely because of the mobility afforded by telecommunications. Id, at 378-79.
15. Whitewater parks extend the normal boating season by maintaining necessary
stream flows in drier months. See Tom Boyd, Paddle Up; White-water Parks are Experiencing a Sort of Ripple Effect, ROCKY MOUNTAN NEWS, Aug. 30, 2003, at 1M. Whitewater
parks in Colorado have been built in Boulder, Breckenridge, Denver, Durango,
Golden, Gunnison, Lyons, Steamboat Springs, and Vail. Id.
16. SeeJason Blevins, Battle Looms Over Kayak Parks Critics: Recreation Sites are Wasteful
Use of Water, THE DENVER POST, June 2, 2003, at IA (noting Colorado leads the nation
in developing whitewater kayaking parks, with twelve parks completed and nine more
planned). According to civil engineer Gary Lacey, whose company has helped design,
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WATER RIGHTS FOR RECREATION

The natural resources of the Rockies largely caused the success'7 of
Colorado's gateway communities-first because of extraction of these
resources and now the recreational uses of these resources. As a result,
these places face conflicting goals of promoting the resort, recreation,
and service industries that give economic life to the communities while
preserving the quality of the natural environment that makes the experience of these places so appealing. 8 What this means for Colorado
water law is that private industry could actually fuel a "quasienvironmental" or "quasi-public interest" argument in the courts and
legislature. This clearly makes for strange bedfellows in terms of the
constituencies that hold stakes in the future of Colorado water law,
because rights in water are decided not by whose interests may override
others on the basis of policy, but by the historical doctrine of prior appropriation. Further, what the Colorado public, environmentalists,
and private industry believe should be "priorities" in policy terms does
not necessarily translate into "priority" in legal terms.
The ChangingDoctrine
Colorado expressly adopted the doctrine of prior appropriation in
its state constitution, " as interpreted in subsequent judicial decisions'
and in legislation."' The creation of a water right in Colorado is accomplished by fulfillment of three elements: 1) intent to use the water;

build, or redevelop whitewater parks throughout Colorado, the parks are in demand
because they can revitalize downtown areas and bring visitors to resort towns during
the off-season. See Boyd, supra note 15, at IM.
17. Success in this context relates to the economic success of resorLs and the like.
Communities like Vail and Aspen are not successful in terms of socioeconomic aspects
of the community, in that people who work in resort communities are often unable to
afford to live in the same or nearby towns. Property values have risen to astounding
levels in Vail and Aspen, such that the cost of living is much higher than what may be
affordable to the average person. Growth of these gateway communities has been
characterized as urban sprawl, displacing the rural character of mountain communities. Bob Sachs, NationalPerspective on Mountain Resorts and Ecology, 26 VT. L. REV. 515,
520 (2002).
18. Those mountain communities that depend on tourism for the local economy
rely on the character and aesthetics of natural surroundings that influence the quality
of visitors' experiences. See McMahon & Propst, supra note 13, at 39-40.
19. COLO. CONsT. art. XVI, §§ 5-6.
20.
Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo.443, 446-47 (1882) ("[I]n the absence of
express statutes to the contrary, the first appropriator of water from a natural stream
for a beneficial purpose has, with the qualifications contained in the constitution, a
prior right thereto, to the extent of appropriation.").
21.
See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-92-102 to-103 (2004).
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2) diversion of the water; and 3) application of the diverted water to a
beneficial use.
"Diversion" remains an evolving concept. Usually meaning a direct
physical taking of water from a natural source, a diversion does not
necessarily mean removal of the water, as in the case of instream
flows. ' The codified definition of "diversion" includes either removal
of water from a natural source or "controlling water in its natural
course... "2 Though this conceptualization of diversion might seem
discordant to the traditional concept of "appropriation," Colorado has
clarified the definition of appropriation to mean "application of a
specified portion of the waters... to a beneficial use....
For the purpose of environmental conservation, the Colorado legislature has also provided for the appropriation of minimum stream
flows by the Colorado Water Conservation Board (CWCB). 6 The Colorado Supreme Court in ColoradoRiver Water ConservationDistrict v. Colorado Water Conservation Board examined this provision challenged as a
failure to divert under the state constitution." The court upheld the
minimum flow statute, concluding that the constitutional language
preserving the right to divert water to beneficial use was not intended
to establish a requirement that appropriation be based on diversion."

22. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. Rocky Mountain Power Co., 406 P.2d
798, 800 (Colo. 1965).
23. VRANESH, supra note 1, at 32-33.
24. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(7) (providing, however, that only a local govemnment entity can control water in its natural course for recreational in-channel diversions).
25.
Id. § 37-92-103(3) (a).
26. Id. § 37-92-102(3).
Further recognizing the need to correlate the activities of mankind with some
reasonable preservation of the natural environment, the Colorado water conservation board is hereby vested with the exclusive authority, on behalf of the
people of the state of Colorado, to appropriate in a manner consistent with
[the state constitution], such waters of natural streams and lakes as the [Colorado water conservation] board determines may be required for minimum
stream flows or for natural surface water levels or volumes for natural lakes to
preserve the natural environment to a reasonable degree.
Id.
27. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. Colo. Water Conservation Bd., 594 P.2d
570, 572-74 (Colo. 1979).
28. Id. at 574. There remains ambiguity in the statutory abolishment of the diversion requirement of appropriation; it could mean that the diversion requirement applies only to the instream use by the CWCB specifically authorized by statute or that
the diversion requirement has effectively merged with the beneficial use element.
VRANESH,supra note 1, at 38.

WATER LAW REVFIEW

Volume 8

InstreamFlows and Recreation as Beneficial Use
Beneficial use of water is the most fundamental diversion requirement.' The rationale for the beneficial use element was to avoid
speculation and to encourage rapid use of water." But what constitutes
beneficial use has been the subject of much debate, especially as patterns of use have changed over the last century with the decline of agriculture. Before the adoption of the Water Right Determination Act
of 1969," ' courts determined the relative priority among uses of water
in times of shortage by reference to the state constitution. The constitution recognizes a domestic preference over those claims for any
other purpose, and those using water for agricultural purpose have a
preference over manufacturing purposes.' The Colorado Supreme
Court did not interpret this list as exhaustive holding in City and County
of Denver v. Sheriff that the municipal use of water for irrigation was a
constitutional beneficial use.3" The court reasoned that the determination of what qualifies as beneficial use is a question of fact that depends
on the circumstances of the case. 4 In general, the common law interpretation of beneficial use under the prior appropriation doctrine
compares wastefulness of a specific use of water to other possible uses
and to alternative means of achieving the purpose for that particular
use. 5
The Water Right and Determination Act expanded the range of
beneficial uses by explicitly stating that impoundment for recreation
(i.e. fishing and wildlife) is a beneficial use.' The Act also includes a
beneficial use for appropriation by the state for maintenance of minimum flows necessary for the reasonable preservation of me natural
environment. 7 Thus, maintaining instream flow became a viable form
of appropriation to establish a water right.
Before the 2001 amendments to the Act, " the court determined
which entities other than the CWCB could appropriate instream flows.
In City of Thornton v. City of Fort Collins, Fort Collins filed an application
for the appropriation of instream flows on a stretch of the Poudre
29. Thomas v. Guiraud, 6 Colo. 530, 533 (1883) ("The true test of appropriation of
water is the successful application thereof to the beneficial use designed; and the
method of diverting or carrying the same, or making such application, is immaterial.");
VRANESH, supra note 1, at 43.
30. Combs v. Agric. Ditch Co., 28 P. 15 966, 967-68 (Colo. 1892).
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-92-101 to -602 (2004).
31.
32. COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 6.
33.
City & County ofDenver v. Sheriff, 96 P.2d 836, 842 (Colo. 1939).
34. Id.
35. VRANESH, supra note 1, at 45.
36. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-103(4) (2004).
37. Id.
38. The language of the current statute expressly authorizes state and local government entities to make such appropriations. Id.
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River running through the city.' Thornton argued that the Act only
authorized the CWCB to appropriate instream flows.' Fort Collins
responded by amending its application.' The city characterized two
dam structures as diversions put to beneficial use: the Nature Dam,
built to return the stream to its historic channel from a flood channel;
and the Power Dam, built upstream to support a fish ladder and boat
chute designed for recreational and piscatorial purposes.' Though the
water court approved the Nature Dam, it denied the Power Dam appropriation, claiming the structure did not amount to a diversion, but
a minimum stream flow appropriation."
The Colorado Supreme
Court on appeal affirmed the Nature Dam appropriation but also held
the Power Dam to be a valid diversion." Citing the statutory definition
of a diversion, the court held that the conventional sense of removing
water from its natural course was no longer the legal requirement for
diversion." The court also declared that a valid appropriation may
result from controlling the flow of water by means of a device or structure employed for beneficial use."
Another decision by the state supreme court in 1992 upheld a decree granting a right to the Upper Gunnison River Water Conservancy
District to refill the Taylor Park Reservoir in order to maintain fishery
conditions." The court held that the Reservoir was a structure that
effectuated beneficial use of captured water for purposes of recrea-

tion."
The series of statutory amendments to instream flow legislation
culminated in 2001, when the Colorado General Assembly established
procedures for local governments to make appropriations for recreational in-channel diversions." Specifically, the legislation amended the
definition of beneficial use to include diversion "by a county, municipality, city and county, water district, water and sanitation district, wa39. City of Thornton v. City ofFort Collins, 830 P.2d 915, 919 (Colo. 1992).
40. Id. at 920.
41.
Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 921.
44. Id. at 931-33.
45.
Id. at 930.
46. Id.
47. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Upper Gunnison River Water Conservation Dist.,
838 P. 2d 840, 854 (Colo. 1992).
48.
!d.
49. Act of June 5, 2001, S. 01-216, § 1, 2001 Colo. Sess. Laws 305, 305 (current version at CoLo. REv. STAT. § 37-92-102(5) (2004)) (requiring local government entity to
submit a copy of the water right application to the CWCB for review within thirty days
of filing for an RICD adjudication); Id. (current version at § 37-92-102(6)) (stating
factors to be considered and requiring findings to be made by the CWCB regarding
RICD requests). Legislation also added new code sections stating standards for decisions by the water court and referees regarding RICDs. Id.§ 3 (current version at §§ 3792-305(13)-(16)).
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ter conservation district, or water conservancy district for recreational
in-channel diversion purposes. " ' Prior to the amendment, the statute
had indicated only fishery or wildlife as recreational purposes qualifying as beneficial uses." The legislature also changed the definition of
diversion to state, "only a county, municipality, city and county, water
district, water and sanitation district, water conservation district, or
water conservancy district may control water in its natural course or
location for recreational in-channel diversions."" Previously, the statute had indicated only the CWCB could hold minimum flow rights." A
new statutory subsection was also added to define RICD as "the minimum stream flow as it is diverted, captured, controlled, and placed to
beneficial use between specific points defined by physical control structures pursuant to an application filed by a [local government entity]
for a reasonable recreation experience in and on the water.""
Though these new provisions have yet to be directly tested in the
courts, the recent case involving City of Golden's application for instream flow rights for a kayaking course suggests these amendments
are viable changes the state's prior appropriation doctrine."5 Specifically, the Colorado Supreme Court let stand the decision of the water
court holding that the appropriation of instream flows for recreational
purposes satisfies the beneficial use requirement under the Colorado
Constitution.'
The Case of Golden
In June of 2001, the Water Court issued a decree granting instream
flow rights to the City of Golden, Colorado, against objections of the
CWCB 7 and the State Engineer." The water court granted a flow rate
50. Id. § 2 (current version at COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-103(4)).
51. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-103(4) (2000).
52. § 2, 2001 Colo. Sess. Laws 305 (current version at COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92103(7) (2004)).
53. COLO.REv. STAT. § 37-92-103(b) (4) (2000).
54. § 2, 2001 Colo. Sess. Laws 305 (current version at COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92103(10.3) (2004)).
55. See Golden Decree, supra note 5. Since the City of Golden filed its application
for the instream flow rights three years before the General Assembly enacted the 2001
amendments expanding the list of government entities eligible for minimum flows, the
case granting the rights to the city did not rule on these issues. More likely, the 2001
amendments are a legislative confirmation of what has happened already in the state
courts-allowing local government entities other than the CWCB to acquire minimum
flow rights, as long as a structure "diverts" the water for beneficial use. See, e.g., City of
Thornton, 830 P. 2d at 929-31; Upper Gunnison River Water Conservancy Dist.,
838 P.2d at
854.
56. Golden, 69 P.3d at 1028, affg by an equally divided court, en banc, Golden Decree,
supra note 5.
57. Like its challenges in City of Thornton, 830 P. 2d at 920 and Upper Gunnison River
Water Conservancy Dist, 838 P.2d at 853, the CWCB argued the appropriation was similar
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of 1,000 cfs to Golden for use in seven dams and deflector devices constructed on Clear Creek to form the Golden White-Water Course. ,'
The Course design allows for the control and concentration of flow
within the creek that sustains use of boating chutes throughout the
year.' The city sought and the water court granted absolute water
rights" for the existing dams and deflectors, plus conditional rights to
maintain optimum flow during May andJuly
In accordance with City of Thornton," the court determined that
Golden made an appropriate diversion of the water by means of controlling the natural flow using the dams and deflectors." The court
affirmed that recreation for boating is a beneficial use of the water,
and stated, "City of Golden derives substantial economic benefit from
the recreational use of the Course. This benefit has been an important
factor in the economic redevelopment of the Golden downtown
area. " ' The court also pointed out that the question of reasonableness
of the amount of water appropriated was not whether the amount is
reasonable in the abstract, but whether the quantity was "reasonable

to an instream flow right that only it was authorized to hold under the statute in effect
at that time. See Golden Decree, supranote 5. See also William H. Fronczak, Court Report,
5 U. DENY. WATER L. REv. 650, 652 (2002).
58. CWCB, the State Engineer, and the Engineer for Water Division No. 1 were the
only remaining objectors after Arvada, Idaho Springs, and Coors Brewing Company
withdrew statements of opposition and Golden stipulated to rights held by the municipalities of Westminster and Georgetown and the Clear Creek Skiing Company and
Clear Creek County. Golden Decree, supra note 5, paras. B-C.
59. Id. paras. D, E(l)-(2), (9).
60. Id. para. D. Golden accomplished the physical diversion of the water in part by
strategic placement of 4,000 tons of boulders creating waves, holes, and eddies. Howard Pankratz, Recreational Water Use Buoyed: Colo. High Court Lets 3 Towns Use Rivers for
Kayak Courses,THE DENVER Posr, May 20, 2003, at IA.
61. Golden Decree, supra note 5, para. E (6) (decreeing flow rights put to a beneficial
use, specifically the absolute cfs to range from 42 cfs in February to 840 cfs in June).
62. Id. para. D. Golden also applied for conditional water rights for each of ten
additional dam structures and deflector devices it proposed adding to the White Water
Course. Id. The court distinguished daytime from nighttime use, selecting 6:00 p.m.
and 6:00 a.m. as the average demarcation between light and dark. Id.para E(6). The
court noted that the city was still only in the planning stage of installing lights to enable use of the Course at night, but that during the diligence period, Golden could
establish actual use to secure absolute rights for 24-hour use. Id.
63. City of Thornton, 830 P.2d at 930 (declaring the control of water in its natural
course to be a valid appropriation).
64. Golden Decree, supra note 5,para. E (7).
65. Id. para. E(8). The water court findings highlighted testimony that the 1,000
cfs sought by the city would support such world-class competitions as the United States
Olympic trials and the Eddie Bauer Classic. Id. The court was particularly responsive
to the observation that thousands of dollars would be generated both by competitors
using the course and spectators attending the events, concluding "Golden's ability to
continue to attract such competitions depends on the possible availability of high flows
in the 1,000 cfs range." Id.
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for the purposes for which Golden made the appropriation."' In considering the reasonableness of the amount of water claimed, the court
stated "[a]lthough not required to consider other potential uses of
water in quantifying a water right under the beneficial use statute, the
Court notes that the rights at issue are non-consumptive, and the water
claimed is always available for all downstream uses."67 Weighing the
economically important recreational purposes of the whitewater course
against the subordination of Golden's rights to senior users downstream' and the city's stipulations to upstream users,69 the water court
found the instream appropriations were reasonable within the statutory requirements for beneficial use.'6 The water court concluded
Golden's constitutional right to appropriate a new water right in accordance with Colorado law may not be denied or limited based upon
the public trust doctrine, or similar policy restraints purportedly

rooted in concern for the quantities that should be left for future water users. "[A] public interest theory is in conflict with the doctrine of prior
appropriationbecause a water court cannot, in the absence of statutory authority, deny a legitimate appropriationbased on public polity."7"

M.

LIMITS ON INSTREAM FLOW APPROPRIATIONS

The decision of the Colorado Supreme Court is less a monumental
ruling than a procedural checkpoint in the tale of three cities. Since
the court issued no opinion, the "ruling" is not really a holding on the
merits of the case.72 This means that the ruling does not set any precedent and applies only to Golden, Breckenridge, and Vail." This leaves
for another day the interpretation of new statutory provisions govern-

66. Id. para. E (9).
67. Id.
68. All of the water claimed by Golden for the whitewater course is subject to a
senior call downstream in a dry water year. Id. Eighty-four percent of the water
claimed is subject to a senior call downstream in an average year. Id.
69. As part of the city's stipulations, up to 41 cfs of the instream rights are subordinated to future exchanges upstream. Id. The court also noted that the city agreed to
provide 125 af of consumable dry year augmentation water in order to meet the projected full build out requirements of the county. Id.
70. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(4) (2004) ("Beneficial use is the use of that
amount of water that is reasonable and appropriate under reasonably efficient pracrices to accomplish without waste the purpose for which the appropriation is lawfully
made...").
71.
Golden Decree, supra note 5, Conclusions of Law (quoting Bd. of County
Comm'rs v. United States, 891 P.2d 952, 972 (Colo. 1995); Aspen Wilderness Workshop v. Colo. Water Conservation Bd., 901 P.2d 1251, 1263 (Colo. 1995)).
72.
Golden, 69 P.3d at 1028.
73.
See Pankratz, supra note 60, at 10A.
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ing the adjudication of instream flow applications by local government
entities.'4
From a policy standpoint, however, many observers interpreted the
supreme court decision as a historic change in state water law, effectively placing the recreational uses of water for kayaking and fishing in
equal standing with consumptive uses for farming, industry, and development.75 However, closer examination of the amended state laws
governing instream appropriations by local entities suggests that procedures empowering the CWCB to impose limits on flow amounts are
likely to encumber the ability of local governments to exploit RICDs.
A reading of the amended statutes reveals that, while enabling local
governments to seek RICDs, the Colorado General Assembly at the
same time boosted the influence of the CWCB by adding procedures
for the adjudication of instream flow rights. Specifically, any local government entity seeking adjudication of an RICD must submit a copy
of its application to the CWCB, who "shall make findings of fact and a
final recommendation as to whether the application should be
granted, granted with conditions, or denied." 8 The factors under
which the CWCB must make findings include:
(I) Whether the adjudication and administration of the [RICD]
would impair the ability of Colorado to fully develop and place to
consumptive beneficial use its compact entitlements;

(II) The appropriate reach of stream required for the intended use;
(III) Whether there is access for recreational in-channel use;
74. The effect of the 2001 amendments on the adjudication of water rights appropriated by a local government entity will be tested when the water court considers an
application by the city of Pueblo, whose officials participated as Amicus Curiae in the
Golden case. See Margie Wood, Colorado High Court Deadlocks on Golden Guaranteedflow
Case, THE PUEBLO CHIEFTAIN, May 20, 2003. Gunnison and Longmont also applied for
RICDs under the new laws. Blevins, supra note 16, at 8A.
75. Pankratz, supra note 60, at IA (reporting statements of Glenn Porzak, counsel
for Golden).
76. See COLO. Rxv. STAT. § 37-92-102(5) (2004) (defining local government entity
as any county, municipality, city and county, water district, water and sanitation district,
water conservation district, or water conservancy district).
77. Id. § 37-92-102(10.3) (defining an RICD to mean "minimum stream flow as it is
diverted, captured, controlled, and placed to beneficial use between specific points
defined by physical control structures pursuant to an application filed by a [local government entity] for a reasonable recreation experience in and on the water."). This
new breed of diversion reserved for local governments is distinguished from the
"minimum stream flows" that remain vested exclusively in the CWCB under statute,
which still reads "the [CWCB] is hereby vested with the exclusive authority...to appropriate...such waters of natural streams and lakes as the board determines may be required for minimum stream flows.. to preserve the natural environment to a reasonable degree." Id. § 37-92-102(3)
78. Id. §37-92-102(6)(a).
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(IV) Whether exercise of the [RICD] would cause material injury to
instream flow water rights appropriated pursuant to subsections (3)
and (4) of this section;
(V) Whether adjudication and administration of the [RICD] would
promote maximum utilization of waters of the state as referenced in
paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of this section; and
(VI) Such other factors as may be determined appropriate for evaluain rules adopted by the board, after
tion of [RICDs] and set forth
7
public notice and comment. 1

Factor I specifically addresses an objection raised by the CWCB in the
Golden case.8" However, the water court concluded in Golden that the
instream flow rights sought by the city would not have the effect of exporting water outside of the state, because the flows sought lay upstream from various customary diversions in-state." At the trial, the
state even conceded the water rights granted to Golden would have no
adverse impact on the state's compact entitlement at issue."
Minimum Flow as a Limitation
Colorado state courts could interpret the new designation of the
RICD as the exclusive means by which local governments may acquire
instream flow rights. The statutory language implies this result by exclusively authorizing the CWCB to appropriate instream flows for con-

servation." Additionally, the statutes limit the allowable amount of
water flow in the definition of RICD to the minimum flow required for a
reasonablerecreational experience in or on the water." A plain reading
of this definition suggests that the CWCB could attempt to significantly
restrict the amount of flow to a level substantially lower than the more
desirable seasonal high water mark most towns would seek. In fact, in
its first exercise under the new laws, the CWCB recommended 250 cfs
of flow for the application by the Upper Gunnison River Water Conservancy District that requested a range of flows from 270 cfs in Sep-

79. Id. §§ 37-92-102(6) (b) (I)-(VI). In addition to the statutory definition of RICDs,
regulations provide that in determining RICD applications, the CWCB shall make
findings as to the appropriateness of requested RICDs for the intended use, considering in part the nature of the recreational activity and whether the requested RICD may
have a negative impact on the environment of the instream flow, including the potential negative effect of constructing the diversions. See 2 COLO. CODE REGS. 4083(7) (b) (vi), (d)(iii-iv) (2001).
80.
GoldenDecree, supra note 5, para. F (8).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-102(3) (2004).
84. Id. § 37-92-103(10.3).
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tember to 1,190 cfs in May for a boating course in Gunnison. " According to the District's manager, the amount recommended by the CWCB
is "barely floatable," and that the peak amount requested by the District falls well below the present flow of the river at 3,000 cfs.8"
Judging from the disparity between the CWCB recommendations
and the flow amounts requested by the Gunnison District, local entities
might find it difficult to anticipate what the CWCB might consider the
minimum flow necessary for a reasonable recreational experience.
The CWCB itself is fully aware of the looming debate over what the
appropriate amount of flow is for RICDs. In a CWCB meeting specifically on the issue of RICDs, and before the Colorado legislature even
codified the definition of RICD, the CWCB questioned whether the
amount of flow should be the maximum amount necessary to achieve
the most desirable boating flows, or the minimum amount needed for
just boat passage, or the amount necessary to accommodate world-class
water sports." While is no legislative mandate for the water court to
adopt CWCB's findings, the law does state that "the water court shall
apply the factors [considered by the CWCB] and that "[a]ll findings of
fact contained in the recommendation of the [CWCB] shall be presumptive as to such facts, subject to rebuttal by any party."' Clearly,
the burden lies with the Gunnison District to persuade the water court
that a reasonable recreational experience on its watercourse requires
higher levels than the minimum flow suggested by CWCB.
85. See Blevins, supra note 16, at8A. As of the date of this article, the water right to
be granted to the District is still undecided after a recent appeal to the state supreme
court. See Colo. Water Conservation Bd. v. Upper Gunnison River Water Conservancy
Dist., 109 P.3d 585, 603-04 (Colo. 2005) (remanding the case to the water court with
instructions to remand to the CWCB for fact finding). The water court initially determined that the District was entitled to more than 250 cfs recommended by the CWCB,
but the CWCB appealed the decision to the Colorado Supreme Court. Id. at 589. The
supreme court determined that the CWCB failed to properly make findings of fact as
to the minimum flows necessary for the specific uses in the District's application. Id. at
592 ("the General Assembly intended for the CWCB to analyze the application purely
as submitted by the applicant, rather than to objectively determine what recreation
experience would be reasonable, and what minimum stream flow would meet that
recreational need."). The CWCB's failure to make its determinations based strictly on
the District's application precluded proper adjudication of RICD rights by the water
court. Id. at 603. The case is being watched closely by other water districts and cities
for an indication of what the practical scope of a recreational instream flow right might
be. See Christine Metz, HearingSet for City Water Request, THE STEAMBOAT PILOT, July 29,
2004, available at
http:/ /www.steamboatpiolt.com/section/frontpagejead/story/24897.
86. Id. (quoting Kathleen Curry, manager of the Upper Gunnison River Water
Conservancy District).
87. Memorandum from Dan McAuliffe, Dan Merriman & Ted Kowalski, to Colorado Water Conservation Board Members, regarding Agenda Item No. 6, Nov. 21-22,
2000 Board meeting Recreational Flow Discussion of Next Steps, available at
http://cwcb.state.co.us/agendas/Nov%2000/AgendaltemNo6.pdf.
88. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-305(13) (2004).
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It remains to be seen how local governments will characterize the
recreational purposes in order to "maximize the minimum" flow. That
is, anticipating that the CWCB will recommend lower than desirable
levels, a town could potentially over-appropriate in an attempt to claim
maximum flows for conditional rights, and during the diligence period
hope to establish the actual flow rate necessary to justify absolute
rights. Glenn Porzak, who represented Golden in its request for instream flow rights, has put his faith in the water court " and has dismissed the minimum flow limitation, stating "[p]eople don't come to
Colorado to enjoy our 'minimum' amount of beauty, to climb our
'minimal'-sized mountains or to have a 'minimal' recreation experience."" It could therefore become vital for local governments that the
state courts interpret the new RICD as an instream flow right measured
by different standards than the minimum flows appropriated for conservation purposes by the CWCB. A differentiation from the minimum
flows necessary for conservation clearly would benefit local governments seeking flows that will maximize recreational experiences.
Therefore, much debate in Colorado courts will likely be over the legislative intent of defining RICDs for local governments separately from
the minimum flows the CWCB may appropriate. One could infer from
the statutory distinction that indeed more than the minimum flow for
conservation may be necessary for a reasonable recreational experience. Perhaps this distinction is also an attempt to avoid lumping
other instream uses of water under the CWCB, which may give the impression that the CWCB in fact represents the public interest. The
distinction generally seems to hinge on the fact that unlike the CWCB,
whose purpose is really serving the public by taking conservation
measures, local governments are not serving the public interest per se,
but instead facilitate private enterprise in the form of attracting tourism and sporting events.

89.
Blevins, supra note 16, at 8A. In Upper Gunnison River Water Conservancy District,
the division of function and authority as between the CWCB and the water court was
clarified. 109 P.3d at 588-98. Construing various sections of the CWCB's enabling
statute, the court held that, while the CWCB conducts fact finding and makes recommendations to the water court, its authority does not encompass "the extensive oversight and adjudicatory authority it sought [in its arbitrary determinations regarding the
Upper Gunnison River Water Conservancy District application]." Id. at 595. Only
factual findings by the CWCB (i.e. that an RICD would impair upstream uses under
compact entitlement), are presumed correct by the water court; the recommendation
of the CWCB is only to be considered as part of the record by the water court, and
therefore is not presumptively correct. Id at 603. However, the applicant still bears
the evidentiary burden to rebut the presumption that the findings of the CWCB are
correct. Absent such a showing based on a preponderance of the evidence standard,
"the findings of the CWCB are binding on the water court." Id. at 596-98.
90.
Rosemary Winters, Colorado Supreme Court Turns Tide in Favor of Kayakers, 35
HIGH COUNTRY NEws 3 (2003).
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Reasonableness of the RecreationalExperience
In Golden, the water court stated, "[w]ater rights in Colorado are
quantified according to the amount of water that is reasonable to serve
the appropriator's intended beneficial use."'" The new definition of
the RICD states that the measure of the water right is the minimum
flow necessary for reasonable recreation.' Apparently, then, the reasonable amount of water for recreational use according to the CWCB is
the minimum flow necessary for that use. This implies that the measure of the water right ultimately may depend on the type of recreational activities for which the instream flows are sought. For example,
world-class kayaking obviously requires significantly more water flow
than fishing.
Cities seeking to maximize the amount of RICDs may thus be
forced to choose from various recreational uses that utilized the greatest flow in water. While recreation is not defined yet in Colorado law,
the term does suggest a variety of uses. Variability in seasonal flow, a
factor already weighed in determining the amount of flow constituting
the water right, could also weigh more heavily in the determination of
reasonableness of the recreational use itself. The latter possibility is
especially likely in times of dry water years, when domestic, agricultural, and manufacturing uses have preference. Debates over what
types of recreation are legitimately beneficial uses of water will surely
emerge as cities attempt to boost their economies by appropriating
RICDs. Conceivably, the Colorado legislature eventually will have to
consider creating statutory preferences. This measure, however, is
unlikely because the doctrine of prior appropriation expresses preference as priority in time.
Efficiency as a Limitation
Some criticize leaving water in its natural course for the sake of
maintaining flow as "wasteful" because water left in its course is not
applied to a beneficial use. Indeed, the Colorado judiciary rejected
the fundamental riparian principle of natural flow long ago, when it
declared that the riparian doctrine made no beneficial use of water

91.
Golden Decree, supra note 5, para. E (9).
92. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-103(10.3). The issue regarding the meaning of an
RICD made its debut in the case of Colorado Water ConservationBoard v. Upper Gunnison
River Water Conservancy District. 109 P.3d at 587-88. The court noted the ambiguity in
the definition of an RICD, in particular the phrases "minimum stream flow.., for a
reasonable recreation experience." Id. at 592. The court found it "improper to defer
to the CWCB's definition of a 'reasonable recreational experience,"' opting instead to
engage traditional statutory construction by examining the language and legislative
history behind the RICD statute. Id. n.8.
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and was not applicable to Colorado." Colorado applied the concept of
maximum utilization historically to promote efficient use of water in
the state. In Fellhauer v. People, the Colorado Supreme Court held
vested rights acquired by appropriation coexisted with the principle of
maximum utilization of water, stating "the right to water does not give
the right to waste it."9" However, because the law has determined
wastefulness of a use is relative to other use patterns, the legal operation of "waste" under the prior appropriation doctrine gives appropriators a disincentive to make diversions more efficient. In the past, water
claimed by an appropriator but left unused or that returned to its
natural channel was lost to junior appropriators." The concept of
waste itself, however, changed when the benefit of its use is leaving it in
its natural course. Objectors can no longer argue that leaving water in
its course is "wasteful" or an invalid use after Golden and the modem
development of Colorado's prior appropriation doctrine recognizing
RICDs as a legitimate beneficial use. Until the state legislature expressly defines "waste," then, the definition of the concept will continue in terms of beneficial use.' And, when opponents of instream
flow rights argue "waste," they will really be arguing over preferred uses
among competing appropriators. As Professor Getches observed, "[i] f
the city of Golden had authorized a subdivision to take the full amount
of water out of the stream, no one would have objected...."" Thus, the
true threat of the instream flow right is not that it is wasteful per se, but
that the consumptive uses needed to sustain population growth will be
subordinate to rights to nonconsumptive uses that, though junior today, will be senior rights in the future."
IV. PUBLIC INTEREST IMPLICATIONS
Instream Flows and PublicInterest Considerations
A major criticism of instream flow rights under Colorado's doctrine
is that leaving water in its natural course is riparian and directly conflicts with prior appropriation principles.' However, as the Colorado
Supreme Court noted in Colorado River Water Conservation District, the
93. See Coffin, 6 Colo. at 447. See also Empire Water & Power Co, v. Cascade Town
Co., 205 F. 123, 128-29 (8th Cir. 1913) (denying landowner from a right to leave water
in its natural course without diminution for piscatorial purposes).
94. Fellhauerv. People, 447 P.2d 986, 994 (Colo. 1969).
95. See, e.g., S.E. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. Shelton Farms, Inc., 529 P.2d
1321, 1325 (Colo. 1974); Comstock v. Ramsay, 133 P. 1107, 1111 (Colo. 1913).
96. See VRANESH, suipra note 1, at 44-52.
97. Winters, supranote 90, at 3.
98. See, e.g., Ed Quillen, Editorial, Why the Water Buffaloes are Snorting, THE DENVER
PoST, June 3, 2003, at 7B.
99. See Rocky Mountain Power Co., 406 P.2d at 800-01; Empire Water and Power Co., 205
F. at 129.

Issue 2

INSTREAM FLOWS, RECREATION, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST

533

test for an appropriation of water is fundamentally whether water is put
to a beneficial use, and that a diversion may legitimately be accomplished by controlling water within its natural course."u Colorado implicates public interest considerations by instream flow rights that have
the effect (if not purpose) of preserving natural flows for environmental conservation.
The PublicInterest in the West
In most prior appropriation states, the entity vested with the power
to grant water rights-usually a court or administrative agency-is required to make public interest or public welfare considerations. '
Where defined by state legislatures, state courts often look to the terms
of public interest statutes to determine what factors those entities
should consider. For example, in Shohal v. Dunn, the Idaho Supreme
Court looked to the statutory language defining instream flows to determine what factors the state's Director of Water Resources was to
consider in rejecting or modifying a fishery's application for water
rights." The Idaho court noted that public interest duties derive from
the larger public trust doctrine. ' Thus, the court ultimately looked to
the state laws defining, inter alia, instream flows and conservation to
determine the elements of the local public interest."' The court concluded that it was in the public interest to conserve and protect minimum flows necessary to protect fish and wildlife, recreation, aesthetics,
and water quality.' 5
Shokal also cited the case of Young & Norton v. Hinderlider.5 In that
case, the New Mexico territorial engineer denied the application for

100. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. Colo. Water Conservation Bd., 594 P.2d
570, 573 (Colo. 1979).
101.
Lori Potter, The 1969 Act and EnvironmentalProtection, 3 U. DENV. WATER L. REV.
70, 76 (1999). In Colorado, the entity granting water rights is the water court and the
supreme court. The CWCB is limited to an advisory role and only gives recommendations for instream flows.
102.
Shokal v. Dunn, 707 P.2d 441, 449 (Idaho 1985) (looking also at similar laws
from Alaska and California to determine the definition of public interest).
103. Id. at 447, n.2 ("protect[ing] the public interest is related to the larger doctrine
of the public trust...'). In perhaps the strongest application of public interest considerations in a prior appropriation context, a California superior court held that even
after the waters from a lake had been acquired by appropriation, "tlhe state ha[d] an
affirmative duty to take the public trust into account in the planning and allocation of
water resources, and to protect public trust uses whenever feasible." Nat'l Audubon
Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d. 709, 727 (Cal. 1983).
104.
Shohal 707 P.2d at 448-49. But see Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Washoe County,
918 P.2d 697, 700-01 (Nev. 1996) (refusing to examine legislative intent in other contexts and limiting the definition of public trust to the state engineer's definition).
105. Shokal, 707 P.2d at 448-49.
106. Young & Norton v. Hinderlider, 110 P. 1045 (N.M. 1910).
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water rights to an irrigation project."7 Instead, he granted rights for a
storage reservoir on the ground that the reservoir served the best interest of the public."° He concluded that the reservoir enabled residents in the surrounding vicinity to purchase water at a lower price
than if the irrigation project had been approved. 9 The court effectively rejected the contention that public interest concerns were limited to broad matters of public health and safety."' The court interpreted the statutory local public interest to secure the greatest possible
benefit from water for the public."'
Environmental factors also implicate public interest according to
the Washington Supreme Court. In Stempel v. Department of Water Resources, an applicant sought a domestic use permit to withdraw water
from a lake, which raised concerns of numerous pollution and health
problems."' The court held that legislative authority requires the
agency granting the permit to consider such factors."' The court inferred this conclusion from Washington's environmental protection
laws enacted subsequent to water permit laws, which did not expressly
require these considerations."' Thus, the public welfare standard required consideration of the negative impact of appropriations on the
local environment.
In contrast to the Western states that implemented public trust
considerations in their water allocation schemes, Colorado purportedly
follows a "pure appropriation" scheme and refuses to acknowledge the
public interest as a matter of law. However, some expressions of the
public interest may be found in the state's laws and, to an extent, in
cases defining water rights.
PublicInterestPrinciplesin Colorado WaterLaw
The Colorado Constitution states "[t]he water of every natural
stream, not heretofore appropriated.. .is hereby declared to be the
property of the public, and the same is dedicated to the use of the
people of the state, subject to appropriation....""' This provision makes
it clear that the public holds rights to the state waters until appropriated.' 0 Further, "recognizing the need to correlate the activities of
107. Id. at 1046.
108. Id. at 1046-47.
109. Id. at 1047.
110. Id. at 1050.
111. Id.
112. Stempel v. Dep't of Water Res., 508 P.2d 166, 168 (Wash. 1973).
113. Id. at 172.
114. Id.
115. COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5.
116. SeeWyatt v. Latimer & Weld Irrigation Co., 29 P. 906, 910-11 (1892) (concluding that the terms "public" and "people" are synonymous and intended to be so by the
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mankind with some reasonable preservation of the natural environment," the CWCB is vested with the exclusive authority to maintain
minimum streams flows necessary to preserve natural environments. " '
This statute essentially codifies public interest principles reflected by
environmental purposes.
In holding that the State Engineer has standing as a party to file a
protest in the adjudication of water rights, the Colorado Supreme
Court in Wadsworth v. Kuiper stated:
There can be no question that, under the inferences in [Article XVI §
5 of the Colorado Constitution] ... the public has a vital interest in
preserving the water resources of this state and adhering to correct
rules for the allotment and administration of water.... [I]t is essential that the relief requested be granted in order that the people may
have their day in court in the assertion of the public interest"
The court reasoned that, by including the definition of "person" for
the purposes of appearing at water adjudication hearings in the 1969
WRDA Act, the Colorado legislature intended to give standing to the
State Engineer, who by protesting appropriations asserted the rights of
the public.'" The court justified its interpretation of legislative intent
by stating that "[t]he Colorado Constitution mandates the protection
of the public interest in water."'"' What appears to make this expression of public interest unique from other Western states is that an
equal part of the public interest is the individual right to appropriate.
The State Engineer also has no express mandate to consider the public
interest beyond the function of contesting appropriations on behalf of
other appropriators.
In Colorado, the entity granting water rights is the water court. A
party may appeal the decision to the Colorado Supreme Court. The
CWCB is limited to an advisory role and may only hold or give recommendations for instream flows. The Colorado judiciary has ruled in
terms of the public interest peripherally at best, diverging from the
legislative implementation of public interest considerations in the 1969
WRDA. In the decade following the enactment of the WRDA, the
courts seemed at least willing to incorporate public interest considerations in its decisions. As indicated above, in 1977 in Wadsworth, the
framers of the state constitution). See also Cent. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. Colo.
River Water Conservation Dist., 526 P.2d 302, 304 (Colo. 1974) (noting the waters of
the state and the right to appropriate are vested in the people).
117. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 37-92-102(3) (2004).
118. But see Hobbs, supra note 4, at 9 (characterizing the statute as an exception to
Colorado's prior appropriation and possibly confirming at least one Justice of Colorado's high court reluctance to consider the public interest in allocating water rights).
119. Wadsworthv. Kuiper, 562P.2dl114,1116 (Colo. 1977).
120. Id. at 1116.
121. 1d.at 1117.
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Colorado Supreme Court specifically stated a mandate by the Colorado
Constitution to protect the public interest in water, which justified the
General Assembly in giving the State Engineer standing to contest adjudications."n Then in 1979, the court again upheld controversial instream flow appropriations-challenged as unconstitutional-in Colorado River Water Conservation District v. Colorado Water Conservation
Board.'
2'
At issue
In 1983, the court decided the case of Alamosa La-Jara.1
was the State Engineer's interpretation of the law governing priority in
the context of interstate compact agreements."'5 The court held that instate users of water might have their supply curtailed in order to satisfy
the essentially treated senior priority rights of out-of-state commitments.' 26 Important for public interest considerations, the court acknowledged the relevance of environmental factors and tempered the
principle of maximum utilization by stating that
the policy of maximum utilization does not require a single-minded
endeavor to squeeze every drop of water from the valley's aquifers.
[Statutory law] makes clear that the objective of "maximum use" administration is "optimum use"... Optimum use can only be achieved
with proper regard for all1 7significant factors, including environmental
and economic concerns.
Seemingly, in Alamosa-LaJara,the Colorado Supreme Court mimicked
the method of the Idaho court in Shokal" by divining public interest
considerations not from any existing statutory mandates, but instead
from subsequent related statutes (i.e. the WRDA granting the CWCB
authority to appropriate minimum flows for conservation) and academic sources." However, unlike the status of the law in Idaho at the
ruling of Shokal, no express statutory duty to consider the public interest in allocating water rights existed in Colorado at the time when the
court decided Alamosa-LaJara,nor does any such statute currently exist. Thus, it seems that the State Engineer might still administer water
rights without considering public interest factors,'" in which case the
122. Id.at1l16-17.
123. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. Colo. Water Conservation Bd., 594 P.2d
570, 572, 578 (Colo. 1979).
124. Alamosa-LaJara Water Users Prot. Ass'n v. Gould, 674 P.2d 914 (Colo. 1983).
125. Id. at 916-17, 919.
126. Id. at 917, 925. See also VRANESH, supra note 1, at 539.
9
127. Alamosa-LaJara,674 P.2d at 35 (internal citations omitted).
128. Shoka4 707 P.2d at 448 (finding that although the statute creating the duty to
consider public interest, it does not define the term, the legislature did provide guidance in a related statute as well as sister states and the academic community).
129. Alamosa-LaJara,674 P.2d at 935 (internal citations omitted).
130.
A. DAN TARLoCK ET AL., WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: A CASEBOOK IN LAW AND
PUBLIC POLIcy 342 (5TH ED. 2002).
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grounds for a challenge would be failure to effect the optimum utilization of water under the maximum utilization doctrine.''
After the Alamosa-La Jara decision, the Colorado Supreme Court
looked at the case of RJA., Incorporatedv. Water Users Association of District 6.112 In RJA., the Colorado Supreme Court denied a water right to
an Estes Park summer resort business that wanted to remove peat moss
from a mountain valley to free waters for appropriation.' Though the
case hinged on whether the waters sought from the peat bog were
tributary and therefore subject to adjudication under the WRDA,
again, as in Alanosa La-Jara, the court noted in terms of public interest
concerns that
[t]he water rights sought here are based upon alterations of long existing physical characteristics of the land. Alteration of natural conditions and vegetation in order to save water carries with it the potential
for adverse effects on soil and bank stabilization, soil productivity,
wildlife habitat, fisheries production, water quality, watershed protection and the hydrologic cycle. Whether to recognize such rights, and
thus to encourage innovative ways of reducing historical consumptive
uses by modifying conditions found in nature, is a question fraught
with important public policy considerations. As such, the question is
especially suited for resolution through the legislative process."'
While RJJ.A. and Alamosa-La Jara are not monumental cases in
themselves, they subtly demonstrate the Colorado Supreme Court's
avoidance of fully implementing considerations of the public interest,
though it clearly acknowledges the intention of the state legislature to
protect those concerns. This is important because it explains, in part,
why Colorado courts can today uphold that the state's doctrine of water rights remains that of "pure" appropriation. Whereas in most other
Western prior appropriation states statutes require a court or administrative agency to consider the public interest in granting water rights,
in Colorado, the state legislature has not mandated these measures. As
such, neither the Colorado water courts nor the state supreme court is
required to adjudicate water rights in consideration of the public interest. Moreover, the current statutory configuration accommodates
this avoidance of the public interest in the courts. As noted above,
principles of the public interest appear by statute only in reference to
minimum instream flows that the CWCB may appropriate and recommend for RICDs sought by local government entities. Even these provisions are not mandates, though, and since the function of the CWCB

131.
132.
133.
134.

Id.
R.J.A., Inc. v. Water Users Ass'n of Dist. 6, 690 P.2d 823 (Colo. 1984).
Id. at 824.
Id. at 828 (internal citations omitted).
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is advisory only, no court adjudicating water rights in Colorado must
consider public interest factors.
Hence, in United States v. Colorado River Water Conservation District,
the Colorado Supreme Court rejected an argument that the beneficial
use test encompassed a broad public policy to protect the environment."' There, the court held that the consideration of the application for a conditional use decree for Arapahoe County for the construction of the Union Park Reservoir did not include evaluation of
environmental factors.t" Environmental groups contended that the
Union Park Reservoir would have adverse effects on such factors as
"fisheries and wildlife habitat, recreation, water quality, the basin's
economy including the tax base, property values and land use, and the
general quality of life-factors they deem [ed] vitally important to the
public.""7 To justify its rejection of these arguments, the court reasoned that the WRDA and its subsequent amendments, in recognizing
the need to protect the environment, established an adequate mechanism for protecting the concerns of the environmental groups.' " The
court further explained that while environmental factors could be a
"reasonable and sound basis for altering exiting law," the change from
precedent would be a legislative function."' The court further excused
itself from making public interest considerations by stating:
The degree of protection afforded the environment and the mechanism to address state appropriation of water for the good of the public is the province of the General Assembly and the electorate. Conceptually, a public interest theory is in conflict with the doctrine of
prior appropriation because a water court cannot, in the absence of

statutory authority, deny a legitimate appropriation based on public
policy. 0

Finally, the enforcement of public interest principles by the Colorado Supreme Court emerged in Aspen Wilderness Workshop, Incorporated
v. Colorado Water Conservation Board.' In 1980, the water court decreed
to the CWCB 12 cfs on Snowmass Creek for preserving the natural en-

135. United States v. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist., 891 P.2d 952, 971 (Colo.
1995).
136. Id.
137. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
138. Id. at 972.
139. Id.
140. Id. But see Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1, 86 (Colo. 1996) (affirming the water court's imposition of a revegetation condition upon the adjudication of a
water transfer, and held that it was within the authority of the water court to "balance
the beneficial use of water with the preservation of other natural resources...").
141. Aspen Wilderness Workshop, Inc. v. Colo. Water Conservation Bd., 901 P.2d
1251, 1260 (Colo. 1995).
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vironment.'' The Colorado River Water Conservation District objected
to the application, claiming that the amount of flow exceeded the
amount necessary to maintain a reasonable natural flow."' Eleven
years after the appropriation, the CWCB decided not to enforce its
appropriation as too high as well as too low during certain times of the
year because of Pitkin County's growth and development in the Aspen
area." The Division of Wildlife initiated an investigation on behalf of
the Aspen/Pitkin County Planning Office, which had contacted the
Division seeking advice in dealing with instream flows in terms of
snowmaking.'
The Division Wildlife found that the CWCB had erred
in calculating the minimum flows for the 1980 decree.' The Division
of Wildlife, upon request of the CWCB, then refigured the winter seasonal flow requirement and concluded that indeed, the CWCB appropriated too much water.' 7 In light of these findings, the CWCB ultimately decided in 1992 to modify its water rights by not enforcing the
full 12 cfs in sections of Snowmass Creek where flows exceeded rates
recommended by the Division of Wildlife."* Conveniently, this reduction in flows enabled the Aspen Skiing Company to increase its snowmaking operation on Snowmass Creek.'
The Aspen Wilderness Workshop, a nonprofit environmental
group,'" filed suit against the CWCB, arguing that the decision not to
enforce its full instream flow appropriation was tantamount to "a perThe Colomanent relinquishment of a public instream flow right....'
rado Supreme Court agreed, and held that the CWCB "has a unique
statutory fiduciary duty to protect the public in the administration of
its water rights decreed to preserve the natural environment. "' Thus,
the court ruled that the CWCB, uniquely charged with holding water
rights in the public interest, was not free to appropriate its water for
any purpose or beneficial use at its discretion. ' Moreover, when the
General Assembly created the CWCB it did not alter the exclusive jurisdiction of the water court over the adjudication of water rights.' 4

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id. at 1253.
Id.
Id. at 1254.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1255.
Id. at 1255-56, n.9.
See Court Puts Crimp in Resort Expansion; Snowmass Creek Water Rights Upheld, THE
DENVER POST, June 20, 1995, at 3B.
151.
Aspen Wilderness Workshop, Inc., 901 P.2d at 1255.
152.
Id. at 1260.
153.
Id. at 1259.
154.
Id. at 1258.
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The authority of the CWCB was therefore limited by statute and water
court adjudications accordingly.'
The court's holding prompted a dissent that specifically objected
to the majority's implication of the public interest in finding a fiduciary duty by the CWCB. Justice Mullarkey argued in dissent that the
CWCB satisfied any fiduciary duties it may have had by acting within its
purported statutory authority to alter its decreed instream flows, and
that no other responsibilities to the public existed.'57 Further, Justice
Mullarkey argued that water judges should not hear matters to determine minimum instream flows for the preservation of the natural environment.' 8 Thus, the issue would not be a "water matter" over which
the water court would have jurisdiction.'
At first glance, it may seem that Aspen Wilderness Workshop, Incorporated presented a platform for the public interest to enter the Colorado
judicial scene. However, loyalists to the idea of "pure" appropriation
could rest their fears that the public trust would come to impinge on
water rights, for the petitioners contesting the CWCB's actions were
careful to base their challenge on a statutorily defined fiduciary duty,
not on the common law public trust doctrine.
V.CONCLUSION
The intersection between public policy considerations and Colorado water law thus remains limited. The initial enactment of instream
flow laws in Colorado seemed to suggest that the state was following
the lead of many other Western states by adapting its prior appropriation doctrine to weigh the public interest in the allocation of water
rights.'6 ' To some, the acknowledgement of maintaining flows in natural watercourses signaled the coming of the public trust doctrine. The
Colorado judiciary, though, has managed to keep public interest factors out of its allocation scheme, albeit by strict statutory construction.
Even after the legislative recognition of RICDs expanded the list of
beneficial use to include instream flows for recreation, public interest
concerns remain the province of the CWCB. Although the CWCB is
155. Id. The court further stated that the CWCB had to seek modification of its
decree from the water court based on two policy considerations: 1) the original decree
as a lawful order had to be given full force and effect until its terms were modified by
the water court; and 2) unlike other appropriators, the C'WCB was to be held to a different standard because of its unique statutory responsibilities to public and limited
authority. Id. at 1259.
156. Id. at 1262-63 (MullarkeyJ., dissenting).
157. Id. at 1263.
158. Id. at 1266.
159. Id.
160. Potter, supra note 101, at 77.
161. See, e.g., Charles F. Wilkinson, Western Water Law in Transition, 56 U. Colo. L.
Rev. 317, 335-36 (1985).
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held to a fiduciary duty to the public while other appropriators are not,
the CWCB is clearly limited to an advisory role and enjoys standing no
different from that of any other appropriator, public or private."' Additionally, should the CWCB make recommendations in the interest of
conservation and the environment, those recommendations must only
be consideredby the water court, not adopted nor followed per se. "
According to Justice Hobbs of the Colorado Supreme Court, "there
are no aspects of the public interest that cannot be protected within
Defending the judiciary's
[the prior appropriation] framework.""'
adherence to the prior appropriation doctrine, Justice Hobbs posited
that each element of the doctrine (diversion, beneficial use, and priority) is consistent with public policy concerns.16 The sections of the
state constitution adopting the prior appropriation doctrine establish a
stable policy for allocating an essential but scarce resource among users." There is nothing particularly sacred about the prior appropriation doctrine, but because Colorado chose this particular scheme, the
courts must honor it as the exclusive means of allocation until the
people of Colorado amend the constitution to adopt an alternative
method.' 7
Justice Hobbs also differentiated public interest considerations
(purportedly expressed by Colorado's prior appropriation system)
from the public trust doctrine (rejected under Colorado's system)."'
While allocation under the public trust doctrine is subject to a determination of navigability conferring a right in the public, the allocation
of water rights in Colorado focuses on the right of citizens to divert
water for beneficial use.' Under the reasoning of People v. Emmert,7°
since Colorado's streams were not navigable at the time of statehood,
and since landowners adjacent to natural streams owned the beds and
banks, the General Assembly should resolve the question of public access to the waters of Colorado, not the courts. 7' Criticized as resulting
in uncertainty of allocation, the public trust doctrine, according to

162. Aspen Wilderness Workshop, Inc., 901 P.2d at 1257-58.
163.
See generally id.at 1259-60 (establishing CWCB's statutory authority with regard
to water courts).
164. GregoryJ. Hobbs,Jr. & Bennett W. Raley, Water Rights Protection in Water Quality
Law, 60 U. COLO. L. REv. 841, 874 (1989).
165.
Id. at 878-79.
166. Id.at 879.
167.
Id.
168. Id. at 874-75, 881.
169. Id. at 879-81.
People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025 (Colo. 1979).
170.
SeeHobbs & Raley, supra note 164, at 881.
171.
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Justice Hobbs, provides no standards by which the Colorado judiciary
may determine allocation among competing demands for water.
Is the PublicInterest Really Expressed by PriorAppropriation?
Colorado's focus on competing appropriators elevates consumptive
interests over conservation interests-unless conservation serves an
economic purpose. Under a democratic model, when representative
state and local governments operate as appropriators, presumably they
should do so in the interest of the public. But under a prior appropriation scheme such as Colorado's, when local governments must
compete for water rights with other appropriators (abuse of police
power issues aside), privatization of public interest considerations occurs. The case of Golden, discussed above, provides an illustration.
Developing a recreational watercourse is a reasonable means of achieving legitimate ends of revitalizing the city's business district to sustain
economic growth in the community, improve aesthetics and quality of
life for the city's residents. The secondary effect of drawing tourists,
and specifically their money, 7 ' is the real purpose of acquiring the water right, though. Acting on behalf of the public in this context means
the city must show that leaving the water in its course-normally
viewed as a measure of environmental conservation-is beneficial.
However, the benefit cannot be for the public interest in terms of environmental conservation. Unlike the CWCB who exclusively may appropriate specifically for this purpose, local governments, by law, must
appropriate instream flows for recreational (i.e. economic) purposes. 7 '
This privatization of the public interest arguably may provide a
perverted means of achieving environmental conservation. Recall that
among gateway communities, redefining their community identity in
terms of developing a recreation and tourism industry based on a
qualitatively superior natural environment is the modern trend. Without intending, local governments could legitimately achieve dual purposes by appropriating RICDs, a prospect nonprofit conservation
groups are already keenly aware of. Environmental groups like Trout
Unlimited and Great Outdoors Colorado have provided major funding
for some of the new boating courses constructed throughout the Colo172. Id. But see Charles F. Wilkinson, supra note 161, at 336 ("The recognition of the
public trust doctrine in water law is the single strongest statement that historic uses
must accommodate modem needs.").
173. See, e.g., Sherry A. Caloia et al., The Water Rights Determinationand Administration
Act of 1969: A Western Slope Perspective on the First Thirty Years, 3 U. DENY. WATER L. REV.
39, 51 (1999). In 1997, the tourism industry in Colorado generated $7.1 billion in
revenue and provided 112,000jobs paying $1.5 billion in salaries. Id. at n.60. About
36 percent of Colorado's tourism dollars were spent in the mountain resort region in
1997. Id.
174. SeeCOLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(10.3) (2004).
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rado Rockies.'
Following the Golden decision, Trout Unlimited indicated the potential for environmental groups to derive substantial
benefits from RICDs sought for economic purposes by stating "[it's]
not a kayaking organization, but these types of (recreational) rights do
benefit fish, because they leave water flowing." 76 Thus, in a somewhat
distorted way, Colorado's prior appropriation doctrine might very well
accommodate the public interest to some measure, at least to the extent that keeping water in its natural course constitutes a beneficial use
under the law (and concurrently to the extent that cities have priority
over junior users).'
Local governments see the Golden decision as a green light to proceed with plans to appropriate instream flows for similar recreational
uses to revive local economies. For example, Fort Collins plans to
build a whitewater kayak park in the next few years, hoping to collect
significant revenue like that claimed by Golden."8 Golden apparently
collects in excess of 2 million dollars annually from the kayakers and
spectators drawn to its park, ' " and in total, the local economy took in
23 dollars million from 45,000 park users plus accompanying spectators in the first three years of park operation." Vail and Breckenridge
also seem to benefit substantially from their whitewater parks, enjoying
increased tourism during the off-season that brings millions in sales tax
revenue."6 ' Many municipalities with access to streams cannot resist the
lure of such revenues, especially when cost comparisons project that
development will yield such large monetary returns.'87
Yet, as Colorado's gateway communities continue to rely on the
recreation industry, tensions will result between sustaining the growth
these communities desire and maintaining the environmental quality
of the area that makes them appealing to visitors and businesses.
175. Trout Unlimited helped fund the Golden whitewater course, and Great Outdoors Colorado funded more than half of the cost for a new whitewater park in Lyons,
Colorado. Blevins, supra note 16, at 8A.
176. Winters, supra note 90, at 3.
177. The instream flow scheme is somewhat of a mixed blessing for mountain municipalities. Caloia et al., supra note 173, at 54 (noting rapid growth of towns due to
the expanding resort, recreation, and tourism industries creates high demand for water flow in local streams, but upstream appropriators holding rights to instream flows
obstruct growth by limiting available water supply for diversion to domestic uses).
178.
See Editorial, Recreation is a Player in State Water Rights, FORT COLLINS
COLORADOAN, July 7, 2003, at A4.
179. Id.
180. Pankratz, supra note 60, at 10A.
181.
Recreation is a Playerin State Water Rights, supra note 178, at A4.
182. Id. (noting that the cost of building a whitewater park in Fort Collins amounts
to about $280,000 as part of a $4.2 million project involving other improvements like
storm drains and cleaning the riverbank). See also Charley Able, In Wake of Ruling River
Runners' Spirits Buoyed, RocxY MOUNTAIN NEWS, May 20, 2003, at 5A.
183. Unlike the prototypical recreation strategy of Vail in skiing and Golden in boating, Kremmling, for example, has specifically limited tourism development to mini-

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 8

Like Golden, mountain communities hoping to grow from the recreation industry will be forced to choose (or at the very least balance) between exploiting and preserving the natural resources that are the very
foundation of the new tourism/recreation industry.
One thing is for sure in the legal realm-until the Colorado General Assembly mandates considerations of public interest factors in
water rights adjudications or amends the state constitution, environmental conservation will justify minimum stream flows only for the
CWCB. In the mean time, public interest groups will attempt to piggyback onto local government RICD appropriations. Municipal water
suppliers already have become important players in the legal arena of
water rights. The inherent stability as public corporations, the ability
to plan for growth and development of utilities, and the ability to finance water development projects through taxing authority make municipal suppliers politically powerful at the local level. 8' Moreover, the
statutory provisions enabling local government entities to appropriate
instream flows also makes them increasingly powerful at the state level.
Market forces will also continue to push Colorado's economy toward
tourism and recreation, and as gateway communities exploiting RICDs
begin to sprawl as a result, public interest concerns in terms of water
supply and water quality will become ever more pressing.
Ultimately, Colorado constituencies-from individuals to communities and local governments to private enterprise-will have to decide
whether it truly is in the best interest of all to compel public interest
considerations in water allocation. On one hand, Colorado needs to
sustain growth in increasingly urbanized areas in an era when traditional industries are replaced by newer ones that still depend on the
bounties of the state's natural resources. On the other hand, the state
also must temper that demand in order to preserve the very elements
that make economic survival possible. Regardless of any desire to adhere to a water allocation scheme entrenched in history, as the preservation of the natural environment becomes more vital to local economies, Colorado lawmakers will eventually have to reconcile goals that
have historically been at odds: maximum application and consump-

mize the industry's impact on the environment and the social and cultural assets of the
small town. See Rasker, supra note 6, at 384.
184. The prospect of amending the state constitution is not far from the minds of
Colorado citizens. As recently as 1996 there has been an attempt to amend the state
constitution by adding a public trust mandate to Section 5 of Article XVI. See MacCravey v. Hufford, 917 P.2d 1277, 1278 (Colo. 1996) (holding that initiative seeking to
amend state constitution did not violate single-subject requirement).
185. SeeJankowski et al., supra note 4, at 22.
186. Id.
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tion of water at present, and conservation of an economic asset for the
future.'

187.
See, e.g., CHARLES F. WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN: LAND, WATER,
AND THE FUTURE OF THE WEST 17 (1992). While apparently there is a broad consensus
in the West that development of natural resources should be prudent and balanced,
"natural resource policy is dominated by the lords of yesterday, a battery of nineteenthcentury laws, policies, and ideas that arose under wholly different social and economic
conditions but that remain in effect due to inertia, powerful lobbying forces, and lack
of public awareness." Id.

